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The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI), a
joint center of Columbia Law School and the Earth Institute
at Columbia University, is the only university-based applied
research center and forum dedicated to the study, practice and
discussion of sustainable international investment. Our mission
is to develop practical approaches for governments, investors,
communities and other stakeholders to maximize the benefits
of international investment for sustainable development.

Oxfam is a globally renowned humanitarian and development
charity with over 70 years’ experience working and campaigning
with partners in over 90 countries worldwide. Originally founded
in 1946, Oxfam today focuses its work on vital issues to tackle
the root causes of poverty; from life's basics - food, water, health
- to complex questions around inequality, gender justice, climate
change and human rights. It works on long-term projects with
communities determined to shape a better future for themselves.
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At the request of Oxfam, the Columbia Center
on Sustainable Investment reviewed select
provisions in the Mines and Minerals Act
2009 and corresponding policy statements
from the Minerals Policy 2018 to provide
recommendations for how to best align the
anticipated new mining law with international
best practice. The following topics were
reviewed:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Fiscal regime
Climate change
Access to and use of land
Community consultations and
participation
Human rights
Community development agreements

The team completed a desk-top review of the
following laws and policies.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Mines and Minerals Act 2009
Mines and Minerals Regulations 2009
Minerals Policy 2018
Local Government Act 2004
The Sierra Leone Environment Protection
Agency Act 2008
Environmental and Social Regulations for
The Minerals Sector 2012
The Income Tax Act as amended by the
Financial Act 2015
The Finance Act 2016
The Extractive Industries Revenue Act
2018
The Financial Act 2019

In addition, the team interviewed key informants
to identify practitioner perspectives on the topic
areas outlined above.
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Sierra Leone’s fiscal regime for mining is known for
being particularly advantageous for companies,
and has in the past failed to strike an equitable
balance between the interests of the country and
those of the companies. This stems from a series of
problems, mainly related to weak provisions in the
Income Tax Act (ITA) and the Mines and Minerals
Act 2009 on the issues of:
•
•
•
•
•

transfer pricing;
thin capitalization;
ring fencing;
head office expenses; and
incentives granted on a negotiated basis
through mining development agreements.

Many of these issues are now addressed by the 2016
and 2019 Financial Acts (FA), the Extractive Industry
Revenue Act 2018 (EIRA) and hopefully the upcoming
transfer pricing regulations. Thus, first and foremost, the
new mining law should align with these instruments by:
1. explicitly referring to the EIRA and relevant ITA/
FA provisions;
2. at best complementing the provisions in
the EIRA and ITA/FA, but at a minimum not
contradicting them; and
3. forbidding any contractual derogation from
applicable laws, and imposing a penalty for
doing so.
The following sections discuss the latest improvements
in the fiscal regime including on investment incentives,
transfer mispricing, ring fencing, and indirect transfers,
while highlighting the remaining loopholes. It does not
propose a new fiscal regime. It is important to note that
the new mining law is not necessarily the instrument
through which the relevant loopholes should be
corrected in all cases.

Definitions
Transfer pricing: the practice of using the multinationals’ network of affiliates to deflate prices
or inflate costs including financial interests so as to reduce taxable income.
Thin capitalization: the practice of abusive borrowing, in particular through shareholders’
loans, to reduce taxable income through loan interest deductions.
Absence of ring fencing: the practice of using the losses of one project to offset the income
of another project when these projects relate to two different license areas.
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Box 1: Singapore and conditional tax incentives
The Government of Singapore provides investors with a concessionary tax or complete
tax exemption for 10-15 years provided they fulfill certain objectives on an annual
basis such as business expenditure, the creation of jobs, payments to local suppliers,
and knowledge and technology transfer. These incentives are provided in law and are
available to all investors that meet the conditions. The Economic Development Board
(EDB) monitors the fulfillment of objectives at the end of each incentive period. Investors
that benefit from the incentives must submit progress reports to the EDB, and run the
risk of having their incentives revoked if objectives are not realized.27

Fiscal investment incentives
As a starting point, in order to discourage companies
from seeking investment incentives on a negotiated
basis, the new mining law should refer to or duplicate
the penalty clause in the Financial Act 2019, section
14:
“Fiscal incentives in any contract, contrary to
prohibited tax and duty exemptions, awarded
by a Government Ministry, Department or
Agency shall be declared null and void.”1

Tax incentives
Tax incentives should be codified in the law,
preferably in the tax law and administered by the
National Revenue Authority
If tax incentives are considered necessary, the law,
and preferably the tax law, should prescribe the
circumstances in which tax incentives could be
granted so that incentives are generally applied and
are granted in a transparent manner.2 Tax incentives
should not be granted by contract as alluded to by
the Policy.3

It has been shown that “mov[ing] tax incentives from
other laws into the tax laws is a critical first step in better
managing the use of tax incentives.” 4 Tax incentives
that are established in other laws and by agencies or
ministries that are not involved in the collection of
taxes presents a moral hazard problem. This is because
those agencies or ministries are evaluated against the
quantity of investment that is generated, as well as
the quantity of tax incentives that are granted without
bearing any responsibility for losses of revenue that
may result.5 The National Revenue Authority through
the tax law should administer the incentive programs
of the country.
If granted at all, tax incentives should be backloaded and regularly scrutinized, in particular by the
Parliament.
Section 3.2.1 of the Minerals Policy 2018 suggests
granting incentives in exchange for contributions
to the sustainable development goals such as
“developing infrastructure and value chain linkages,
employment creation, knowledge and technology
transfer, as well as greater use of local services and
supplies.” This approach is certainly preferable over
unconditional incentives but it could be as inefficient
if incentives are front-loaded. Incentives should be
back-loaded, which means they are granted only
when goals are reached.6 Even if back-loaded, the
use of such incentives should be closely scrutinized
and should only be granted if the likely benefits
clearly outweigh the expected revenue loss that they
are likely to result in. See box above on Singapore.
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As a general point, the Government should review
the extent to which tax incentives that have been
granted in the past effectively lead to the realization
of long term goals. This is especially important as:
1. ITA, section 32 already grants tax
deductibility at 125% for training, export
promotion activities and social expenses;
2. ITA, section 37 already anticipates a 125%
investment allowance for R&D spent related
to the project (at the exclusion of R&D
spent on locating minerals); and
3. FA 2015, section 24 already grants
corporate income tax holidays for 5-10
years depending on the size of the
workforce and the minimum investment
when there is at least 20% Sierra Leonean
ownership in the company.
If such incentives have not contributed to the goals
intended by the law (training, export promotion,
job creation, etc.), the Government should consider
reviewing how incentives are granted. In addition,
these expenses for which incentives provide an
uplift should be externally audited, follow the
transfer pricing regulations, and the spending
categories should proceed from a plan validated by
the national or local governments. The Parliament
should be involved in this review.
Revise corporate income tax holidays
The Government should consider revisiting the
corporate income tax holiday included in the
ITA. Corporate income tax holidays are generally
considered inefficient because they are only relevant
once a mine is in a tax-paying position, which may
be beyond the tax holiday period. In addition,
they are deleterious because they can lead to high
leakages if businesses reorganize themselves to
benefit from tax holidays in unintended ways.7 For
example, a company could choose to shift profits
through transfer mispricing from older mines that
do not benefit from tax holidays to newer ones that
do benefit from tax holidays to continue enjoying
the effect of tax holidays longer than intended (e.g.
the older mine could sell goods and services to the
newer miner mine at above market price). “High
6 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

grading” is another risk that the Government takes when
granting corporate income tax holidays.8 High-grading
is the practice of increasing the rate of extraction or
strategically extracting high-grade ore during the tax
holiday period to reduce the revenues available to tax
after the expiry of the tax holiday.9
To mitigate these negative implications, the new mining
law could complement the ITA by:10
•

•

Requiring that a mining company’s taxable
income is calculated normally during the tax
holiday period, which implies requiring regular
submission of the tax return and deduction of
all depreciation costs instead of pushing their
deduction beyond the tax holiday expiry to
avoid extending the period during which the
taxable income is artificially reduced;
Putting in place measures to avoid the
impacts of ‘high-grading.’ For example, the
Government could agree to a tax holiday
on a tonnage-of-ore extracted basis; for
instance, Mali’s Mining Code 2012 stipulates
that, if the production level exceeds that
approved annually by the company’s board
of directors by 10%, the generally applicable
corporate income tax rate will be applied to
the excess. If Sierra Leone’s new mining law
were to include a similar provision, unlike
in the Malian Mining Code 2012, we would
recommend benchmarking the production
level to the feasibility study rather than to the
board’s decision, which may not be sufficiently
transparent nor objective.

Ideally the new mining law would not interfere with
the ITA and the next Financial Act would repeal the
tax holiday granted by the ITA altogether. Instead of
tax holidays, there should be incentives that defer
taxes rather than waive them. It is preferable to have
accelerated depreciation and loss, as well as carryforward, as is already the case in Sierra Leone. Over
time, fewer countries have been offering tax holidays
because of their limitations.11

A Review of Sierra Leone's Mines and Minerals Act 2009

Revise customs duty exemptions
We note the important amendment brought about
by FA 2016 to customs duty exemptions. FA 2016
reduces the exemption from 5 years to 3 years, and
excludes spare parts, general vehicles and imports for
resales from the exemption. Excluding spare parts from
the customs duty exemption is particularly important
to avoid discouraging the emergence of the spare
parts business in Sierra Leone. FA 2016 also imposes
a threshold and does not grant this exemption for
businesses investing under the threshold of $10M for
a new investment and $5M for an existing investment.
While the intent of FA 2016 is to encourage large
investment, by the same token, FA 2016 in fact hurts
the competitiveness of SMEs. Further amendments to
the ITA should address this issue.
Incentive packages must be closely scrutinized
using fiscal models, cost-benefit analyses and by
parliamentary oversight
Before deciding on an incentive package, the
government should develop a fiscal model
looking at the overall fiscal package to understand
the
effectiveness,
usefulness,
fairness
and
competitiveness of the incentive package. In addition,
all fiscal incentives need to be costed in terms of
their revenue loss; the government should conduct
a regular tax expenditure analysis showing the
revenue cost from incentives and exemptions, which
should be made public and debated in Parliament.
Finally, Sierra Leone should follow the regional
debates on regional tax harmonization and actively
collaborate with partners in the region to eliminate a
race to the bottom.12

Stabilization clauses
Another fiscal and regulatory incentive is the fiscal
stability clause. The changes brought by EIRA 2018
that limit the applicability of fiscal stability clauses
to a maximum of 10 years (EIRA, section 40) are
positive; it also prevents companies from having the
choice to either benefit from fiscal stability granted by
contract, or opt to take advantage of potentially more
favorable tax arrangements arising from amendments
to the EIRA or ITA enacted after the contract has been

entered into (EIRA, section 41). To avoid doubt, the
new mineral law should reiterate that contractual fiscal
stability clauses are subject to the terms of EIRA 2018.

Transfer pricing
We are aware that new transfer pricing regulations
are being drafted. The new mining law should clearly
cross-reference the upcoming instruments (to the
extent the transfer pricing regulations are adopted
before the new mining law is passed) and clearly
indicate that these regulations must be followed in
assessing both sales (Mines and Minerals Act 2009,
sections 148 and 154) and expenditures for all projects.
The Mines and Minerals Act 2009 only requires the
application of the arm’s length principle for sales, and
this requirement only applies to holders of large-scale
mining licenses that have a capital expenditure above
US$5 million. This should be broadened in the transfer
pricing regulations. In addition, we expect the new
transfer pricing regulations to define “affiliates” and
“related party” as these terms are not defined in the
ITA, or in the Mines and Minerals Act 2009.
Transfer pricing regulations are also expected to
cover the risk triggered by multinationals’ use of
offshore "service hubs,” for finance, insurance,
legal, marketing, or IP development services. There
is a risk that service hubs could charge the Sierra
Leonean mining subsidiary fees in excess of services
rendered, which would enable profit shifting to these
offshore “hubs.” This practice and the possible ways
of mitigating the risk is well captured in the World
Bank publication, “Transfer Pricing in Mining, with a
Focus on Africa.”13 The World Bank notes that:
“While (…) [multinationals] exercise their
discretion as to how they wish to structure
their global business to achieve the best
outcome for their shareholders, they must
ensure that the degree to which the tax
base of the source country is eroded as
profit is shifted abroad is commensurate to
the value actually added by their overseas
subsidiaries.”14
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It is notable that the FA 2019 has taken very good
measures to discourage this practice: it amends
section 32(2) of the ITA 2000 by disallowing the
deductibility of expenses related to "copyrights
and industrial property rights in trade and banking
services, technical, scientific and similar knowhow, knowledge and skills such as plans, designs,
process“15 if payments for these services are made
to a related party. In addition, FA 2019 repeals and
replaces FA 2016, Section 37 by increasing the
withholding tax rate on management and technical
service fees from 15% to 20% of the value of
services that provide “a taxpayer with professional,
managerial, scientific or engineering advisory and
other support services.”16
Similarly, transfer pricing regulations should also
address the issue of head office expenses, which
also represent a risk for profit shifting. While
this topic was addressed by FA 2016 in the Sixth
Schedule (“where a deduction for head office
expenses exceeds one-half percent of sales,
any excess of such expense shall be treated as a
dividend,”) it has now been repealed by EIRA 2018,
with no replacement.
Lastly, we expect the transfer pricing regulations
to mandate private ruling or advanced pricing
agreements for all transactions that do not have a
reference price. Right now, ITA section 168 provides
for private ruling but it is seldom implemented.
While this might be because of an institutional
constraint, the regulations could usefully specify
when these rulings should mandatorily be used and
their contents.
Thin capitalization rules should also be addressed
by the new transfer pricing regulations. The
Finance Act 2016 has improved regulation of
thin capitalization, for example, by limiting the
deductibility of interest from shareholders’ loans
using a debt to equity ratio (FA 2016, section 8).
In addition, the EIRA 2018 limits the recovery of
interest above the deductibility cap to 10 years
(counted from the year of commercial production
or the year of the incurred loss, depending on what
comes later) (EIRA 2018, section 7 and 5). In further
iterations of the FA, the deductibility limitation could
8 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

be changed to align with the recommended Action 4 of
the OECD’s Base Erosion Profit Shifting project setting
a fixed ratio for debt as a percentage of EBITDA,
the Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and
Amortization (i.e.: the company’s operating income).
For the mining sector, this ratio is recommended to
be around 20-25% while the arm’s length principle
should be applied to shareholders’ loans. A debt to
EBITDA ratio is preferable over a debt to equity ratio
as companies could subvert the debt to equity ratio
by converting debt into equity or vice versa though
transactions with affiliates.17
Moreover, ITA, section 119(2)(c) and FA 2019 consider
exceptions to the imposition of withholding tax on
interests. The ITA leaves the exception at the discretion
to the Commissioner, which is problematic. FA 2019
makes an exception for longer-than-two-year-loans
granted to aid export activities, for which international
companies investing in the mining sector might well
qualify. Withholding tax on interest is a key instrument
that can be used to discourage thin capitalization, since
this is a tax imposed on the interest paid on loans. As
such, there should be discussions as to whether the new
mining law should carve out the mining sector from
these exemptions.

Ring fencing
Ring fencing is now addressed adequately by many
provisions of the EIRA (section 4 (3) and (4) and section
5). In addition, the EIRA has made necessary changes
to the accumulation of deductible losses: the deduction
of exploration expenses is limited to 7 years (section
17) (whereas there exists unlimited deductibility under
the Mines and Minerals Act 2009, section 155 (4)); loss
and carry forward remains limited to 10 years (counted
from the year of commercial production or the year of
the incurred loss, depending of what comes later); and
tax payable to more than 15% cannot be reduced (EIRA
2018, section 8).

A Review of Sierra Leone's Mines and Minerals Act 2009

Indirect transfers

State participation

Also known as change in control, indirect transfers
in the chain of underlying ownership of the mineral
rights is now addressed by EIRA 2018, section 9.
Indirect transfers are taxed with a change of ownership
equal to or higher than 25%. Moreover, any change
of ownership equal or above this threshold should
be declared to the authority. We are of the view
that not only is this threshold too high (it is 5% in
Ghana for instance)18 but that all indirect transfers
should be declared for at least three reasons: 1) it
can enable the tax administration to reflect on the
feasibility of lowering the threshold by amending the
tax law, 2) it will limit tax avoidance opportunities by
empowering the tax administration to decide if/when
the threshold has been reached instead of leaving this
determination to the companies, and 3) it will help
trace beneficial ownership as will be required by EITI
from 2020. While the revised mining law should not
contradict EIRA 2018, it can circumvent this problem
by simply deferring to the EITI’s latest standard and
stipulating that it is applicable even in the context of
change in control.

The Mines and Minerals Act 2009, section 162
stipulates that the Government has the right to
acquire a participating interest in the project on
terms agreed with the license holder. While we can’t
advise on a specific interest that the State should
take, we note here a few principles to keep in mind
for the new mining law:
•
•

•

•

As mentioned, it is never wise to leave terms
to be negotiated;
Dividends might be paid with a lot of delay
because dividends never have the priority
in payments–first comes taxes, then debt
payments, and then dividends. With tax
planning, the payment of dividends can be
pushed off considerably;
Paid up equity can be very costly for the
government, carried interest by the investor
can be accompanied by above market
interest, and free equity is most often
negotiated against a tax concession; and
The revenue impact of state equity can be
reproduced by tax instruments that are more
certain, as explained in this IMF note.19
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Aspects not addressed by EIRA AND ITA/FA
that could be usefully addressed by the new
mining law
Annual Charges: The Mines and Minerals Act 2009
discusses the imposition of “annual charges” to be
paid on the grant of the mineral right, as “may be
prescribed” (section 152). The uncertainty embodied
in this phrasing should be clarified in the new mining
law by explaining which authority will prescribe these
charges, when, and according to which criteria. This
should not be left to contract negotiation.
Use of derivative instruments and hedging: EIRA
gives a very vague definition that should be clarified
in the new mining law.20 Companies could use the
extracted minerals to hedge against the price of
other minerals, for instance through the use of futures
contracts. In this case the minerals might not be sold
at the highest world price, as required by the Mines
and Mineral Act 2009, section 154, thus reducing
payments owed to government through tax, royalties
and other fiscal instruments. The new mining law
could stipulate that even when derivative instruments
are used, all payments to the Government will remain
determined as if the minerals were sold at the market
reference price, i.e.: the effects of hedging are
ignored as recommended by the IMF.21 This would
be more effective than EIRA, section 7, that attempts
to neutralize the effect of derivative instruments by
stipulating that the financial cost resulting from the
use of derivative instruments can only be included
in the income computation if their financial gains are
also included. The EIRA provision leaves room for
interpretation, and it does not necessarily reduce the
risk or impact of the use of hedging. It also limits the
neutralization attempt to tax types indexed to income,
ignoring that hedging can also impact the royalty base
for instance. As for the Minerals Policy 2018, while it
shows some awareness of the problem, it only invites
the government to take a position on it.22

Penalties for non-compliance with tax law and
fiscal provisions: While the Mines and Minerals Act
2009, sections 158 and 160 respectively include a
2-year and a 1-year prison sentence that may serve as
an effective deterrent, all the other monetary penalty
schemes (included in sections 158 and 160 of the
Mines and Minerals Act 2009 and in ITA, sections 154
- 158 and 160 - 162) are too low to be a deterrent for
an international company. All in all, there is a need to
raise the monetary penalties to levels that incentivize
international companies to comply with the tax law
(and with any other relevant laws).
Permanent Establishment: Permanent Establishment
(PE) is usually defined in Double Tax Agreements
(DTAs) and in the ITA. Its definition determines the
extent to which a foreign business is subject to tax
in the source country. The ITA defines the Permanent
Establishment clause for all industries as: “Foreign
permanent establishment means a fixed place of
business of a resident person situated in a foreign
country where the business is conducted continuously
for at least 183 days, but excludes any place at which
only activities of a preparatory or auxiliary nature are
conducted.”
The extractive industries present specific challenges
for this clause that are explained in CCSI’s note,
“Understanding how the various definitions of
Permanent Establishment can limit the taxation ability
of resource- rich source countries.”23 This is because
companies sometimes use short term specialized subcontractors in activities leading up to the production
stage and/or the supplemental activities involved
in maintaining or terminating production, and
these sub-contractors could avoid being classed as
“permanently established,” and thus avoid taxation
in Sierra Leone. They would do so by splitting
contracts to stay under the 183-day threshold and
fragment activities to ensure that activities fall under
the exemptions granted to “preparatory or auxiliary
activities.”
Because extractive industries are the mainstay of Sierra
Leone’s economy, it is advisable for the new mining
law to complement the ITA’s permanent establishment
clause and reinforce rules that might be circumvented
in the context of extractive industries. Ideally, though,
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this revision would occur in the ITA and in particular
in the DTAs since DTAs override domestic law.
Provisions that could usefully be added include:
•

•

•

Complementing the definition of the term
permanent establishment and adding that
a permanent establishment also includes
a mine, [an oil or gas well if the change
is made in the ITA], a quarry or any other
place of extraction of minerals [or natural
resources if the change is made in the ITA];
An anti-fragmentation rule where specific
activity exemptions (i.e. preparatory or
auxiliary nature) do not apply when a
company or a closely related company
carries out business activities in one or
more places in a contracting State, and
either (1) one or more of such places
constitute a permanent establishment
for one of the related companies, or (2)
the overall activity resulting from the
combination of the activities carried on by
the two companies at the same place, or
by the same company or closely related
companies at the two places, does not have
a preparatory or auxiliary character.24
An anti-contract-splitting rule: where the
aggregation of time spent performing
activities at a place that constitutes
a building site, construction project,
installation project or other specific project
identified in the permanent establishment
definition, as long as these activities are
carried on during one or more periods of
time that, in the aggregate, exceed 30
days; or where the aggregation of time
performing connected activities in a place
that constitutes a building site, construction
project, installation project or other specific
project identified in the PE definition,
if these activities are carried out during
different periods of time, each exceeding
30 days, by one or more closely related
companies.25

This anti-fragmentation rule and anti-contractsplitting rules come from the OECD BEPS’ Multilateral
Convention (MLI) which is an instrument that parties to
a DTA can use to modify the DTA to avoid tax evasion
and avoidance scheme. Sierra Leone only has three tax
agreements in force (United Kingdom, South Africa,
Norway) and the country could usefully engage the
parties to the DTAs to adopt the recommendations of
the MLI.26 The MLI’ s minimum mandatory standard to
adopt is the Principal Purpose Test aimed at limiting
treaty shopping by granting the benefit of the treaty
only to investors that have a real economic purpose.
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Integrate climate change considerations into the
mining regulation
Sierra Leone is one of the world’s ten most vulnerable
countries to climate change.28 With temperatures
set to rise by 1-2.5°C by 2060 and increasing climate
variability, Sierra Leone is particularly vulnerable to
the impact that this will have on its economy, its
environment and its people.29
Sierra Leone is heavily dependent on natural
resources, with agriculture providing employment
for around 75% of the labor force, around 60% of
which is at the subsistence level. 30 Sierra Leone’s
natural resources are currently being threatened
by rapid population growth, increasing energy
consumption, and deforestation and water pollution
from “environmentally unsound” mining activities
and farming. The changing climate acts as a “risk
multiplier” by increasing climate extremes, and in
the case of Sierra Leone, floods, landslides and
droughts.31
Mining exacerbates Sierra Leone’s climatic
vulnerabilities to the extent mining activities
compete for fresh water sources with local
communities, contaminate clean water sources
with waste effluents and tailings, and contribute
to deforestation which exacerbates soil erosion,
landslides and flooding in the rainy season. As ore
grades continue to decline and minerals need to be
more intensively processed, mining will also become
more energy and water intensive.32 This will in turn
greatly increase mining companies’ greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions. The mining of low grade ore also
results in more waste being produced, that needs to
be carefully planned for and managed.33
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At the same time, the mining sector is also vulnerable
to the adverse impacts of climate change. The mining
sector in Sierra Leone has already suffered setbacks
and economic losses from the damage caused to
infrastructure and hindered operations by extreme
weather events such as floods and landslides, resulting
in lost revenues for mining companies and Governments
alike. The multiplier effect of climate change on these
types of weather events means that it is not only in the
interest of Sierra Leone, but also the mining companies
operating in Sierra Leone, to proactively mitigate,
prepare for, and adapt to climate change.
The Mines and Minerals Act 2009 contains no provisions
to mitigate or manage the effects of climate change.
The current mining law’s environmental provisions
only include an obligation on mining license holders
to carry on operations “in a manner that is reasonably
practicable in order to minimize, manage and mitigate
any environmental impact including but not limited to
pollution resulting from such operations” section 132),
and water and timber may be used “as necessary”
(section 114). There is also no reference to water use,
tailings management, or atmospheric emissions, and
no requirement to properly assess, monitor or report on
these in the environmental impact assessments (“EIA”)
or environmental management plan (“EMP”).
In this context, the 2018 mining policy acknowledges
the impact of climate change (clause 3.9.2) and requires
Government to work with mine operators “to develop
clear and comprehensive climate change mitigation,
response and adaptation plans for the minerals sector”
in relation to the full mine life cycle from pre-production,
to operation, to mine closure.

A Review of Sierra Leone's Mines and Minerals Act 2009

Interestingly we note that the FA 2016, section 34
stipulate customs duty exemptions for the import of
photovoltaic systems, low energy or energy efficient
appliances that follow the standard of the International
Electro-Technical Commission. This incentive should
facilitate the use of renewable energies and energy
efficient design by mines.
The new mining law should implement the mining
policy statement by including provisions to mitigate
the effects of climate change, better adapt the mining
sector to withstand climate change vulnerabilities,
minimize the water footprint of mining activities, and
better manage waste effluents and tailing storage
facilities. Deforestation should not be allowed without
the prior approval of the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”), and the discharge of waste effluents
and tailings into surrounding water sources should be
strictly prohibited.
Mining plan submissions should include requirements
for mining companies to demonstrate that the
proposed mine design and equipment:
•
•
•
•

•

is the most energy efficient design to minimize
energy consumption on the mine site;
is the most water efficient design to minimize
the use of fresh water and maximize the use of
dewatered, recycled and treated water;
includes an effluent waste and management
system that minimizes the risk of spillages and
tailings storage failures;
includes details on how a mining company
intends to source energy from renewable
energy sources to minimize its carbon
footprint; and
gives local communities access to renewable
energy sources with arrangements for
compensation.

The new mining law should require Environmental
Impact Assessments to include the following:
•

•

An assessment of the impact of the proposed
mining activity on the following, along with the
proposed strategy to minimize the impact: 34
o water use and waste water discharge;
o greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions,
along with the projected quantity
of emissions in accordance with the
Greenhouse Gas Protocol35;
o mining-project related waste such as
acid mine drainage, overburden and
tailings storage and disposal with the
goal of achieving zero tailings storage
failures; and
o vegetation and already cleared mining
areas (from existing operations) and
soil erosion.
A model to assess: (i) the climate-related
impacts on the proposed mining activity and
(ii) the impact of climate-related risks on the
proposed mining activity (increased flooding,
heavier rainfall, drought), including the risk of
tailings spillages and storage failures, during
the life of the mine and post-closure. This will
help to inform decisions around the design and
placement of infrastructure and operations.36

The new mining law should specify a minimum list of
items that should be included in the EMP,37 based on
the risks identified in the EIA. The list should include,
but not be limited to:
•

•

•

A GHG emissions reduction strategy, along
with updated reporting on CO2 emissions
in accordance with the Greenhouse Gas
Protocol.38
An emergency preparedness plan to deal
with environmental and climate-related
emergencies on the mine site, including from
flooding, landslides, drought, tailings storage
spillages, and widespread disease.
Impact of mining activities on surrounding
water sources.
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Public consultations conducted to seek free prior
and informed consent (see section on consultations
below) should include engagement on climate
change risks and adaptations, and tailings storage
and management so that they can also make
informed decisions about the risks and mitigation
strategies.
The new mining law should include community
access to a renewable energy source as one of
the topics to negotiate in the CDAs. In addition,
communities should negotiate financial as well as
other relevant support to develop climate adaptation
and resilience strategies, including to address
impacts on livelihoods, immediate humanitarian
climate impacts, and longer-term disaster risks.
We note that Kenya and Ghana have both deployed
a policy and legal framework to tackle climate
change that will soon be tailored to mining.39
Sharing knowledge and experience with African
countries that already incorporated climate change
in their policy and legal framework could help make
progress more quickly on this issue.
Water use
Require mines to minimize fresh water use and
maximize water re-use and recycling
Climate change poses significant challenges
to the availability and quality of water in Sierra
Leone.40 The country has an abundant source of
water resources, with seven major rivers connected
through a network of twelve water basins,41 but
rainfall is unevenly distributed throughout the
country and highly seasonal, and infrastructure to
collect and store water is limited, leaving parts of
the country with severe water shortages during
the dry season from October to April.42 Increasing
climate variability is also resulting in less predictable
and more severe seasons, with torrential rains and
flooding become an increasing feature of the rainy
season and drought becoming increasingly common
in the dry season.
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Water quality is also impacted by climate change.
Water pollution caused by runoff of pollutants from
agricultural production and mining activity is already
degrading available water sources. An estimated 80
percent of the rural population obtains its water directly
from the boreholes, rivers and wells that are vulnerable
to water shortages and contamination. Deforestation
is increasing soil erosion, and the increasing intensity
of summer rainfall is resulting in much higher runoff
from sediment and mine effluents into rivers. Increasing
temperatures will also increasingly impact water quality
by increasing the growth of toxic algae blooms and
waterborne diseases.
Water is required at each stage of the mining process
to suppress dust, process ore, cool and wash mining
equipment, and manage waste tailings. Hard rock
mineral mining is particularly water intensive because of
the extensive processing and beneficiation of minerals
that is required to separate the minerals from hard rock
and other matter, a process that will become increasingly
water and energy intensive as ore grades decline.
However, fresh potable water is not needed for most
mine stages of the mining process. Mining companies
should not be competing with local communities for
fresh water sources and should minimize the impact
of their operations on the quality of surrounding water
sources on which communities rely.
Under the Mines and Minerals Act 2009, water can be
utilized “as necessary for mining operations” (section
114(e)). There are no restrictions or requirements on
how much water can be drawn and from which sources.
Prior approval from the EPA is only required if a mining
company wishes to divert a watercourse, or to carry out
dredging activities (sections 135-136). There is also no
legal regime in place to regulate water use or allocate
it among competing users. The 1963 Water (Control
and Supply) Act requires license holders to obtain a
water extraction license from the Ministry of Water
Resources. However, in practice, this requirement has
not been implemented and there is no mention of water
permitting in the current mining law or any of the EPA
legislation.43
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The new mining law should require mining operations
to minimize their water footprint. This can be done by
including provisions that require:
•

•

•

•

•

The submission of the mining plan to
demonstrate how a proposed mining project
or any extension or expansion of mining
operations has been designed with maximum
water efficiency so that the need for fresh
water extractions are minimized, water is
recycled and treated before discharge into the
environment (see Box on Western Australia).
A rigorous assessment of water requirements
in the EIA, so that fresh water is only used when
there are no alternative sources available such
as water from dewatering, recycled water, salt
water, and seawater. The source and quantity
of fresh water extracted should be specified in
the EIA and reported on in the EMP (see Box
in South Africa).
The new mining law should not permit water
to be extracted as necessary and, in the
absence of a water permitting process, should
limit water extraction to the quantities and
sources approved in the environmental impact
assessment (see Box on Canada).
The new mining law should require mining
companies to minimize the discharge of any
contaminated water into surrounding water
sources and to treat all wastewater, including
dewatered water, to an acceptable water
quality level prior to discharging it. Mining
companies that are unwilling or unable to
comply with environmental regulations should
be subject to strict penalties.
The new mining law should considerably
increase the quantum of the penalties charged
for environmental or water violations.

South Africa’s water license allocation
process
In South Africa there is extensive legislation to
control the allocation and use of water. Mining
companies must apply for water use permits
from the Department of Water Services, which
has the power to reduce the amount of water
allocated to a mining project when there is
insufficient water for competing users (such
as neighboring communities). A full water
monitoring program must also be included
as part of the environmental management
program that is submitted in order to obtain
a mining licence.49 There are also regulations
to govern water quality in mine usage which
require mining companies to recycle water to
the extent possible.50
Canada’s water license allocation process
In Canada, separate permits for ground and
water sources are required, which are reviewed
by the Ministry of Forests, Lands and National
Resource Operations. If the use or diversion
of water is likely to result in an adverse impact
on water quality, a mining company may
be required to submit a plan with proposed
mitigation measures before a surface or ground
water permit is issued.51
Western Australia’s water permit application
procedures
Western Australia’s procedures for assessing
an application for a water permit are the most
rigorous in the world and should serve as a
reference point. They “include an in-depth
assessment of water source options, water
demands, the management of dewatering
volumes, the need for efficient water use, and
the broader ecological, social and cultural
values that may be impacted.”52
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Outputs

Department of Water

Inputs

Mines andand
Minerals
Act 2009
Stage A A Review of Sierra- Leone's
Identification
shared
Preliminary
understanding of any critical
Consultation
issues that may affect approval of
the project and conceptual water
balance

- Provides advice and information
on the complexity of water issues,
availability and known impacts within
the area in response to proponent's
outline of proposals

- Proponent prepares outline of
proposal and consults with agencies
to determine complexity of water
issues
- Conceptual water balance

Stage B
Scoping the Water
Management Task

- Agreed scope of regulatory
requirements and information
needs for a license application
and prediced water balance
indicating major uses and
sources of water
- 26D license for exploration /
investigation granted subject to
assessment and conditions

- Provides advice and guidelines to
the proponent to help determine
the scope of the assessment, what
information will need to be supplied
to the department for assessment
and preliminary advice on water
management objectives
- Assessment of 26D license
applications

- Proponent and agencies scope
the assessment requirements and
timetable
- Application for 26D license
- Conceptual water balance (noting if
mine will produce surplus water due
to dewatering).

- Finalized hydrogeological /
hydrological report detailnig
water availability
- Development of conceptual
water balance on water systems
and use preliminary mine closure
plan
- Environmenal review
documenation finalised as
a requirement of the EPA
approvals process and EPA
decision

- Assesses the proponent's application
documents including hydrogeological
/ hydrological reports and water
management objectives and outcomes
- Provides advice to EPA and other
government agencies and advises
proponent with some direction if
further work is required.

- Proponent conducts agreed
investigations and prepares
appropriate hydrogeological
assessment documents.
- Applications for 5C license for
the mining project (and permit
applications where relevant).
- Proponent responds to submissions,
undertakes required assessments.

- Approved mine site operating
strategy
- Nominal water balance for the
mine site
- Issue 5C licenses (and permits
where relevant) for the mining
project subject to conditions

- Assesses license application and draft
strategy
- Decides on appropriate terms and
conditions for license after considering
hydrogeological / hydrological reports,
environmental information and other
approvals including alignment to EPA
recommendations and environmental
conditions.

- Draft operating strategy
incorporating commitments from
the EPA's assessment and approval
process
- Finalise any additional work
required

- Ongoing assessment of monitoring
and reporting commitments made
within the operating strategy to ensure
adaptive management
- Regulation as per conditions of the
license including license inspections /
audits

-License provides monitoring reports
and other information as required
during the term of the license,
conditions and commitments of the
operating strategy
- Confirm and improve management
with evaluation of goals and targets
with monitoring, reporting, and
taking action.

- Makes recommendations to DMP /
EPA about ongoing monitoring and
reporting commitments

- Proponent implements mine closure
plan (based on DMP/EPA guidelines)

↓ 				

↓ 				

Stage C
Water License
Application and
Environmental
Authority (EPA)
Assessment

↓ 				

Stage D
Development of an
Operating Strategy
and Final License
Decision

↓ 				
Stage E
Construction,
Operation, and
Closure Planning

Stage F
Decommissioning
and Closure

- Leading practice water
efficiency and management
- Monitoring and adaptive
management of the water
balance to minimize impacts
from the mining operations
-Proponent finalises the mine
closure plan before mining
operations cease

↓ 				

- Decommissioning of waterrelated assets, site rehabilitation
and management of impacts
beyond the life of the mine

↓ 				

↓ 				

↓ 				

↓ 				

↓ 				

Source: Western Australia’s Department of water policies and guidelines53
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↓

↓

↓
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Mine Tailings - storage design, management and
monitoring
Tailings are extremely harmful to the environment
and local communities when their improper storage
results in nearby water sources being contaminated
with dangerous minerals and acid water, or a tailings
dam failure devastates an area. 44
Tailings are a major waste stream of the mining process.
They are generated as a by-product when extracting
minerals and separating them from other materials
in the ground.45 They include ground rock and sand,
heavy metals, chemicals used in the beneficiation
process, and processed water.46 Tailings are usually
discharged in the form of a slurry to a storage area
called a tailings storage facility (“TSF”) or a tailings
management facility ("TMF"). Tailings dams are the
most common way to store tailings, though they can
also be stored underground in dry stacks in mined out
gaps by a process known as backfilling.

The mining policy also makes no specific reference
to waste discharge and tailings beyond reference
to minimizing the environmental impact of mines
and international best practice including the IFC
Performance Standards, whose Performance Standard
1 only addresses tailings in passing.
Strict regulations are required to ensure that mine
effluents, including tailings, are not directly discharged
into surrounding water sources, that they are carefully
and properly stored in TSFs designed in accordance
with international best practice, taking into account
the heightened risks of climate change.

Given their chemical composition, tailings pose large
risks to people, nearby water sources, the environment,
and agriculture when they are not properly stored at
a safe distance from local communities and water
sources. There is also an increasing risk of tailings
dams failures in recent years,47 which is set to increase
as the mining of low grade ores produces more waste
and climate change acts as a “risk multiplier” through
increased flooding, landslides and torrential rains.
The current mining law only contains limited obligations
on a mining company in relation to effluent discharge.
In fact, section 114 of the current mining law provides
that license holders may (i) “dispose of any mineral
products recovered”; and (ii) “stack or dump any
mineral or waste product in a manner approved by
the Director [of Mines] in consultation with the health
and environmental authorities.” The draft Operational
Regulations for the Mining Sector 2012 require mining
operations to comply with international standards
in relation to, among other things, the discharge of
liquid effluents, solid waste disposal (overburden)
that could seep into ground water, water quality, and
river diversions. However, to date they have not been
enacted.
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The new mining law should specifically address
tailings storage, with the aim of introducing detailed
regulations to govern the design, management and
monitoring of tailings storage facilities (see Box on
best practices). In particular:
•

•

•
•

Mining Plan: Mining companies should
be required to demonstrate that the
tailings storage facilities are designed in
accordance with the latest global safety
standards on tailings management. The
International Council on Mining and Metals
(ICMM) is working with the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) and
Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI)
to establish an international standard on
tailings facilities management. These and
all following updates ought to be followed
by mining companies operating in Sierra
Leone. Moreover, tailings facilities are to
be located in a place that minimizes the
risks of spillages into surrounding water
sources, particularly those accessed by local
community members. Dam construction
methods known to be high risk (such as
upstream) must be avoided.48 Lastly, the
mine design should incorporate remediation
as a continuous process with restoration of
tailings every 5 years.
EIA and EMP: The EIA needs to include
an assessment of the risks of tailings
spillages and TSF failures, including the
impact of climate change on these risks.
The EMP should include an obligation to
demonstrate that adequate monitoring
capacity of tailings dam failure risk is in
place; it should include both internal and
external monitoring systems with the goal of
achieving zero tailings dam failures. External
inspection systems should involve the latest
technologies such as satellite based remote
sensing, include report disclosure, and
involve citizen monitoring.
There should be strict and high penalties for
non-compliance.
The new mining law should prohibit the
discharge of tailings into nearby rivers or
other water sources, including underground
where tailings can contaminate water basins.
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Best practices around tailings dam design
and approval process
Best practice includes a mix of detailed
tailings storage guidance and regulations,
independent monitoring of tailings storage
facilities, and the enforcement of financial
and criminal sanctions for non-compliance.54
In Ghana, a separate regulation governs the
design and construction of tailings storage
facilities.55 The design and construction of
tailings storage facilities must be done by
a qualified engineer approved by the Chief
Inspector of Mines. The location of a TSF
is also regulated. Each mine with a tailing
dam is required to appoint an independent
engineer to conduct yearly dam safety
audits.56
In British Columbia, Canada and New
Mexico, United States, with the EIA
submission, mining companies must
provide a detailed description of how they
will manage tailings as a well a justification
for the approach. The tailings design
can also be addressed in the discharge
permits: for example, in Arizona, United
States engineered plans for the disposal
of wastewater must be submitted for
approval jointly with the state wastewater
disposal permit. In Nevada, United States
a specific permit is required before the
construction or modification of any tailing
impoundments.
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The Mines and Minerals Act 2009 vests ownership
and control of minerals on or under land in the
State.57 This ownership structure is common, and
aligns with laws that govern mineral ownership in
most countries in the world, with few exceptions.
While common, this ownership structure creates
a tension between the State’s sub-surface rights
to minerals, and land owner’s and users’ rights in
land. This tension must be carefully regulated
and managed by the State in accordance with its
human rights obligations, namely its obligations
to respect, protect, and fulfill the fundamental
human rights and freedoms of its people as set
out in the Constitution 1991, and the regional and
international human rights instruments to which
Sierra Leone is a party.58 The Mines and Minerals
Act 2009 includes a number of provisions that seek
to regulate how this tension is managed in practice,
and the new mining law should aim to improve on
the foundational principles set out in the Mines and
Minerals Act 2009 and accompanying regulations.
This section will consider key land-related
provisions in the Mines and Minerals Act 2009 and
the Minerals Policy 2018 with recommendations
for improvement. It is important to note, however,
that a new National Land Policy was adopted
in 2015, which lays out a roadmap for updating
Sierra Leone’s land laws.59 The Minerals Policy
2018 helpfully recognizes that the National Land
Policy should guide land rights-related matters in
mining. The simultaneous reform of land laws and
the mining law presents an important opportunity
to align land-related provisions in the new mining
law with the anticipated land laws to avoid one
instrument undermining the other. The Ministry of
Mines and Minerals Resources should coordinate
closely with the Ministry of Lands, Country Planning

& the Environment in this regard, and recommendations
in the section that follow should be read with this in
mind.
Terminology
Use the term "customary land owners and users"60
rather than "legal and equitable owners of land" or
"person who legally owns land and has title to…land’’
It is unclear what is meant by the reference to ‘legal
and equitable owners of land,’ and ‘land owners in
law and equity’ in the Minerals Policy 2018. The new
mining law should avoid using these terms. Instead the
new mining law should refer to ‘customary land owners
and users.’61 Relatedly, we recommend amending the
definition of “lawful land owner” in the Regulation to
the Mines and Minerals Act 2009 (Regulations 2009).62
The Regulations 2009 read: “lawful land owner means
a person who legally owns land and has title to the
said land.”63 This definition could arguably exclude all
customary land owners in the Provinces whose land is
not formally titled. Even in the event that new land laws
do provide pathways for formal titling of customary land
(as envisaged by the National Land Policy 2015), a formal
title should not be a required in order for customary
land owners to be considered "lawful land owners." The
land laws of Tanzania, Mozambique, Kenya, Ghana and
others recognize that the introduction of land titling and
registration regimes should not delegitimize existing
customary rights that have long been recognized as
legitimate, merely for failure to title.64 This is especially
so as land titling and registration is a resource and time
intensive process, spanning years if not decades. For
example, Tanzania and Mozambique enacted land
laws in 1999 and 1997 that provided pathways for
land registration; and while some customary land has
been registered as a result of the laws, the majority of
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customary land in each country remains unregistered.
Therefore, we recommend that the new mining law
and accompanying regulations amend the definition
of "lawful land owners" to reflect the realities of land
ownership in the Provinces by referring to customary
land owners and users.65
Consultation and consent
Improve the consultation requirements by requiring
companies that apply for all exploration or mining
licenses – including large-scale mining licenses– to
seek and obtain the free, prior and informed consent
of all communities and peoples who stand to be
affected by proposed operations in advance of a
license being granted

Currently, the Mines and Minerals Act 2009 and
accompanying regulations require applicants for
artisanal or small scale licenses to first seek and
obtain the ‘consent’ of the Chiefdom Mining
Committee or lawful owners or occupiers of land
before submitting a license application.66 In contrast,
the Mines and Minerals Act 2009 requires holders
of exploration licenses (rather than applicants),
to ‘inform’ land owners and users about general
exploration activities.67 The requirement to ‘inform’
is a lower standard than consent because it does
not suggest any opportunities for land owners and
users to participate in decisions relating to the land
that they own or use. In addition, the requirement to
inform land owners and users is engaged after the
exploration license is issued, thus confirming that
land owners and users do not have any opportunity to
participate in and influence the licensing process. In
keeping with human rights principles of participation,
it is important to consult and seek the consent of
communities who stand to be affected by projects as
early as possible, including before the issuance of an
exploration license.

Source: Adapted from Rachel Davis “Enhancing Extractive Companies’ Respect
for the Human Rights of Affected Communities”, Shift
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Similarly, the Mines and Minerals Act 2009 does
not generally require a large-scale mining license
applicant to obtain the free, prior, and informed
consent of land owners or users before a license
is granted; the obligation is merely to consult.68
It is only after a license is granted that in certain
circumstances the holder of a large-scale mining
license must obtain the consent of land owners
or lawful occupiers where the relevant land is:
‘dedicated as a place of burial’; a ‘place of religious
or other cultural significance;’ ‘within 200 meters…of
any inhabited, occupied or temporarily unoccupied
hose or building;’ ‘cleared or ploughed or…
prepared for the growing of…agricultural crops;’
or within 100 meters of ‘any cattle dip, tank, dam,
or other body of water.’)69 While these exceptions
are encouraging, particularly because they seek
to protect cultural rights, the circumstances under
which a large-scale mining license holder is required
to obtain the consent of land owners and users is
too narrow.
Helpfully, the Minerals Policy 2018 anticipates
harmonizing the consent requirement, and refers
to requiring mining license applicants to seek
the ‘informed consent’ of land owners before
issuance of a mining license (which presumably
includes large-scale license and exploration license
applicants). The new mining law should clarify that
the consent requirement applies to applicants for
all exploration and mining licenses, and should
also align the requirement for consent with the
more robust standard of “free, prior and informed
consent” to measure up to international standards
and emerging norms.70

In addition, the new mining law should extend the
requirement for free, prior and informed consent to all
communities and peoples who stand to be affected by a
project, rather than just requiring the ‘informed consent
of land owners, in law and equity’ (as is suggested in
the Mining Policy 2018). Land users and others who live
outside the contract area may still be affected by the
project, and should therefore have a say in and influence
over decision making around the project. Liberia’s newly
enacted land law includes an example of this type of
provision in practice (see box below).
The Mines and Minerals Act 2009 suggests that in
the case of applications for artisanal and small scale
licenses the grant of consent from the Chiefdom
Mining Allocation Committee can displace the need
to obtain consent of land owners and occupiers.71 The
new mining law should either require the consent of
the Chiefdom Mining Allocation Committee and the
free, prior, and informed consent of all communities
and peoples who stand to be affected by a project
(including women and youth) before the grant of any
mining license (if it is indeed appropriate to require the
consent of the Chiefdom Mining Allocation Committee);
or only require the free, prior, and informed consent of
all affected communities including women and youth.
In keeping with human rights principles, it is important
that consultation and consent processes are inclusive
with meaningful opportunities for affected communities
to participate in decision-making. It is therefore critical
that the new law does not grant the Chiefdom Mining
Allocation Committee or relevant Chiefdom authorities
final or sole decision-making power in these matters.

Liberia Land Rights Act 2018, section 33(3)
“… any interference with or use of the surface of Customary Land
require the Free, Prior and lnformed Consent (FPIC) of the Community”
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The Mines and Minerals Act 2009 also contains
a provision that allows the Minister of Mines
considerable discretion in deciding whether an
applicant needs to obtain the consent of rights
holders at all if, in her view consent is unreasonably
withheld.72 This provision should be narrowed, and
aligned with Constitutional protections against
deprivation of property.73 The new mining law
should remove the highly discretionary right of the
Minister to decide whether the need for consent
can be dispensed with in circumstances where rights
holders withhold consent to mining operations. If
consent is withheld and the Government considers
it strictly necessary for the project to go ahead, the
new mining law should require the Government
to first consider whether the particular case fulfills
criteria for compulsory acquisition as set out in
the Constitution, and whether such an acquisition
would be compatible with the State’s human rights
obligations. Provisions on compulsory acquisition
in the new mining law should align with the criteria
and compensation requirements for such takings
set out in the Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991.
The compulsory acquisition criteria set out in the
Mines and Minerals Act 2009 while similar, do not
align with the Constitutional criteria completely.74
The Mines and Minerals Act 2009, for example,
operates on the assumption that it is appropriate
to compulsorily acquire land for use by the holder
of a large-scale mining license.75 This suggests
that large-scale mining is in all cases considered to
satisfy the various criteria set out in the Constitution
including that large-scale mining ‘promot[es] the
public benefit or the public welfare of citizens
of Sierra Leone,’76 which is arguably not the case
in certain situations. In addition, the criteria and
procedural rules for compulsory acquisition of land
should be detailed in the new land laws,77 and the
mining law should not deviate from a framework set
out in the new land laws.
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Resettlement
The Mining Policy helpfully recognizes that
additional guidance and regulation of mininginduced resettlement is required. New regulations
on this topic should take as the starting point that
resettlement should only be considered in exceptional
circumstances.
Where resettlement is strictly necessary, comprehensive,
fair, and adequate compensation must be paid to
restore the resettled individual or community to enjoy
the same or better quality of land and living standards
as was enjoyed before the resettlement. This is because
numerous human rights are impacted when communities
have to be resettled, and the Government has the
obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill the human
rights of its population. For example, cultural rights are
implicated, as are the rights to an adequate standard of
living, food, water, and housing, among others. As such,
if companies are involved in resettlement efforts, the
Government is under a duty to monitor and regulate
company activity to safeguard the human rights of
resettled populations.
In the case that the Government compulsorily acquires
land for mining purposes the Mines and Minerals Act
2009 suggests that either monetary compensation will
be made available to impacted communities or if it is
their preference, impacted communities will be resettled
on suitable alternate land.78 The Minerals Policy 2018
helpfully identifies livelihood restoration as the principal
goal of resettlement compensation.79 Livelihood
restoration necessarily requires replacement land of
equal or better quality, and monetary compensation,
and other types of support to restore access to natural
resources including water, services, and livelihood
activities. The new mining law should avoid taking
the either/or approach to monetary compensation
and replacement land that is found in the Mines and
Minerals Act 2009.
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Key things to consider when drafting new resettlement
regulations include:
•

•

•

Clarification of institutional roles and
responsibilities
for
resettlement.
The
Government should play a central role in
coordinating and overseeing the process
given the Government’s obligations to
safeguard the rights of affected communities.
The resettlement provisions in the Mines and
Minerals Act 2009 could be clearer on the
Government’s role in resettlement.
The Government should put in place criteria
and guidelines for ensuring that compensation
is sufficient to achieve the goal of livelihood
restoration. The Mines and Minerals Act 2009
leaves compensation to be determined by
the parties or by the Minister on the advice of
the Minerals Advisory Board.80 This approach
is incomplete because such a determination
should in practice be informed by “detailed
socio-economic baseline studies to develop
a thorough understanding of every impacted
household’s livelihood.”81 Public participation
and close and regular consultation and
collaboration with affected landowners and
users is critical to designing and implementing
resettlement plans. In order for participation
to be meaningful, affected households should
have access to all relevant information and
studies, as well as legal and technical support
so that they can engage in such a negotiation
apprised of all relevant information to
evaluate various compensation and livelihood
restoration proposals.
The rights of land users must be considered in
addition to the rights of land owners, and land
users should also be compensated for mininginduced resettlement given the potential
disruption to their livelihood activities.

•

The new resettlement regulations should
include details of how disputes arising out of
resettlement activities will be resolved. Access
to effective remedies for affected land owners
and users is an important part of planning the
resettlement framework.

In the case of consultation, consent seeking, and
resettlement, the Government and companies should
be required to implement gender-responsive and ageresponsive stakeholder engagement that promotes
the participation of women and youth.
Rental income for Landowners
Landowners should earn all surface rent income
with appropriate income taxes levied as per Sierra
Leone’s income tax laws
The Mines and Minerals Act 2009 requires the
holder of a large-scale mining license to enter
into a lease agreement with the ‘lawful occupier
of the land,’ and pay surface rent for such rights.
It is unclear why the Mines and Minerals Act 2009
requires surface rent payments to be divided up
between those who own the land, and other bodies
including the District Council, Paramount Chiefs,
Chiefdom Administration, and the Constituency
Development Fund.82 In the case of privately held
land, this would effectively amount to a 50% tax
on rental income. The drafting of a new mining
law presents an opportune moment to reconsider
whether this division of rental income strikes an
appropriate balance. In addition, the new mining
law should refer to and reflect the new land
laws that are anticipated to have important new
provisions on women’s land rights. Such provisions
may impact how and to whom rental income is
paid, which could be reinforced by the new mining
law.
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Require that all affected communities have the
option to enter into a CDA rather than limiting this
option to the "primary host community"
The Mines and Minerals Act 2009 requires smallscale and large-scale license holders to implement
a community development agreement (CDA) with
the ‘primary host community.’83 This suggests that
if there are multiple communities affected by a
mine’s operations, only the community identified
as the ‘primary host community’ will benefit from
the implementation of a community development
agreement. The new mining law should allow for
conclusion of CDAs with multiple host communities.
This approach is taken in Kenya’s Mining (Community
Development Agreement) Regulations 2016, which
requires license holders to first assess the impact of
its operations in order to identify the community or
communities with which community development
agreements will be concluded.84

Require license applicant to conduct a human rights
impact assessment in addition to an environmental and
social impact assessment, which can inform identification
of affected communities (i.e. potential parties to a CDA)
The Mines and Minerals Act 2009 requires the local
council, or, if there is disagreement, the Minister, to
identify the ‘primary host community’.85 But identification
of affected communities should take place during the
completion of the Environmental and Social Impact
Assessment ("ESIA') – before a license is issued. In
addition, a human rights impact assessment should
be concluded or incorporated into the ESIA to assist
in identifying the potential human rights impacts of a
project and help to identify communities who may be
affected by a project, and who should therefore have
the option of being party to a CDA. CCSI has developed
a methodology86 for collaborative human rights impact
assessments that may be suitable for application in this
regard.
Require continual monitoring of project impacts to
identify whether, as project operations change, new
communities are impacted; and require that newly
identified communities have the option to enter into a
CDA if they so wish
Because a project’s activities may change over time,
impacts may manifest themselves differently at different
stages of the project. Because of this, the license
holder, the Government, and local authorities should
be required, by law, to continually monitor the nature
and reach of a project’s impacts on nearby populations,
and periodically review together with those populations
whether additional CDAs with additional communities
should be entered in to.
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Mandate the provision of legal and technical assistance
for communities engaging in the negotiation of CDAs,
with adequate financing for ongoing support
While the Mines and Minerals Act 2009 requires
CDAs to be concluded between companies and host
communities, and provides guidance on the topics to
be included, it is silent on how such agreements are to
be negotiated in practice. Sierra Leone’s National Land
Policy helpfully recognizes the need to address the
power imbalances that are inherent in a negotiation
process between a company and a community in the
context of land-based investments, and commits to
setting up a legal assistance fund to finance legal and
paralegal assistance to communities, landowners,
and land users to support such negotiations.87
Legal and other technical support should be made
available during initial CDA negotiations, to monitor
the implementation of CDAs, to review the CDAs
on a periodic basis, and to represent communities
in resolving disputes as they arise. This is critical
to achieving equitable CDAs that properly reflect
the priorities of affected communities, and that are
successfully implemented in practice. The Minister
of Mines and Mineral Resources has an important
opportunity to improve the CDA negotiation and
implementation process by collaborating with the
Ministry of Lands, Country Planning & the Environment
and other interested entities (e.g. Legal Aid Board) on
the implementation of the financing commitment in
the National Land Policy. CCSI published a discussion
paper outlining possible financing solutions for
legal and technical assistance.88 Sierra Leone’s Draft
Guidelines for Sustainable Agricultural and Bioenergy
Investment 2013 provides an instructive example:

“…after registering with the country’s
investment promotion agency, [companies]
would periodically pay a mandatory fee
calculated to cover the average monthly cost of
a Sierra Leonean lawyer. Companies would then
submit a consultation plan detailing how they
will seek to obtain the free, prior and informed
consent of communities potentially affected
by the proposed investment. Companies
would then carry out consultations and impact
assessments, before negotiating leases with
community land owners and a memorandum
of understanding and agreement with the
government. The fund would be administered
by the District Council, with oversight by the
Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone.
Money would be allocated to pay a lawyer
chosen by the community from a network
of justice organizations and practitioners
supported by the Human Rights Commission.
The lawyer would provide “community
justice services, including legal advice,
assistance, representation and [...] education
in the negotiation process” with the company.
Proponents of “large and huge scale impact
projects” would pay the fee monthly, while
smaller projects would pay the same fee
but on a less frequent basis (thus paying
proportionately less overall).”89
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Strengthen CDA monitoring and implementation
mechanisms
The Mines and Minerals Act 2009 requires small
and large-scale license holders to "substantially
comply with community development agreements
under the Act."90 This provision should be amended
to remove the word ‘substantially’ so that it reads:
licenses holders are “required to comply with all
provisions set out in community development
agreements entered into under the Act.” The
word ‘substantially’ in the current law weakens the
obligation of license holders to comply with all
CDA provisions at all times. In addition, in order
to incentivize compliance and implementation of
CDAs, the new mining law could explicitly state that
compliance with the terms of a CDA is a condition of
any small or large-scale license issued, and therefore
a breach of a CDA is a breach of the license terms.91
In the same vein, CDA reporting provisions should
be strengthened in the new mining law. The Mines
and Minerals Act 2009 requires license holders to
report to the Minister on activities and expenditures
in respect of a CDA annually, and the Model CDA
sets out further requirements for the annual reports.
This provision should be improved in the new mining
law and require license holders to report on all
license holder obligations in respect of a CDA, with
evidence of activities and expenditures undertaken
in fulfillment of those obligations. Each annual
report should be reviewed by a multi-stakeholder
group, which includes a representative group of
parties/beneficiaries and relevant local authorities
to validate the content.
While the Mines and Minerals Act 2009 includes a
provision that requires CDAs to include details of
consultative and monitoring frameworks between
the license-holder and the host community,92 and
the Model CDA includes guidance on this too, in
practice, monitoring and implementation of CDAs
remain weak. Drafters of the CDA regulations
should seek to understand the practical and
political challenges faced when implementing such
provisions and account for these challenges in the
drafting of the regulations.
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The provision on funding for administrative activities
set out in the Model CDA should be replicated in the
CDA regulations, with specific reference to funding
for monitoring activities. More generally it would be
desirable to incorporate the Model CDA into the new
mining law.
Identify/establish accessible and effective grievance
mechanisms
For circumstances where license holders fall short
of fulfilling CDA obligations (and indeed in the case
of all project-related disputes), there should be an
independent grievance mechanism that is accessible
and appropriate for the needs of potential users
(including women), to hear complaints. The findings of
a report on non-judicial grievance mechanisms in Sierra
Leone could be instructive in considering how existing
mechanisms could be strengthened, or new ones set
up, in the context of CDA-related or other grievances.
A number of (non-exclusive) options for reform were
presented in this report for consideration including:
“(1) strengthening existing institutions by
providing them with clear complaints mandate
and building their capacity on issues such as
gender equality, fair hearing and record-keeping;
(2) creating one non-judicial institution that
deals with all types of land-related disputes with
branches all over the country;
(3) instituting one such body to deal with certain
administrative or high-level disputes; and
(4) establishing an institution that serves as a
secretariat coordinating the dispute resolution
work of all existing non-judicial [grievance
redress mechansims].
However, it is important to state upfront
that these are not ready-made and exclusive
recommendations, but proposals to be explored
in the context of policy and law reform and
implementation processes”93
If there is ongoing work to establish or improve nonjudicial grievance mechanisms in the context of land
disputes, there may be an opportunity to expand the
mandate of such mechanisms to include the resolution
of CDA disputes. If this is not considered appropriate,
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any grievance mechanism mandated to resolve CDArelated disputes must operate independently of
interested parties, and thus it is not appropriate for
the Minister of Mines to be the final arbiter of such
disputes, as suggested by the Mines and Minerals
Act 2009 and the Model CDA.94 Importantly, the new
mining law, and indeed any CDA should not restrict or
preclude access to the courts.
Include mechanisms for communities to meaningfully
influence spending of community development funds
in representative ways that include and give sufficient
weight to the priorities of traditionally marginalized
peoples including women and youth
One of the key objectives of the Diamond Area
Community Development Fund, which was
established to implement post-war transformational
efforts, is to enable local communities to promote
their own development agenda.95 The Community
Development Fund was devised later but similarly
to provide funding for community development
goals as identified by affected communities. In
keeping with human rights principles of stakeholder
participation, communities should, in law, and in
practice, have a voice in the development of local
development plans so that funds are put to use in
furtherance of community identified goals. Thus,
the new mining law and accompanying community
development regulations should include mechanisms
for communities to meaningfully influence spending
in representative ways and in ways that include and
give sufficient weight to traditionally marginalized
peoples including women and youth.
Detailed information on planning and spending
should be made available and accessible to host
communities. This could include, for example, holding
quarterly public meetings with affected communities
to provide project updates in culturally appropriate
ways, and also include holding separate meetings for
women, if appropriate, to encourage greater female
participation in community development projects.
The transparency and accountability provisions set
out in the Model CDA should also be reflected in the
new mining law.

The Model CDA contains many provisions on the
management of funds, with various committees to
oversee activities. It is important to understand why
there are still challenges in implementing inclusive
decision making and oversight in spite of these
provisions. This is important so that the new mining
law and community development regulations can
properly account for and mitigate the practical and
political challenges faced.
Correct the percentage contribution to community
development funds and require companies to publish
their gross annual revenue in accessible ways
As is indicated by the MMA Reform Proposal Memo,
it was originally intended that license holders
contribute 1% of gross revenue earned per year to
funding community development rather than ‘one
percent of one percent’ as is set out in the Mines and
Minerals Act 2009. Indeed, some companies have
already entered into CDAs that set their contributions
above the 0.01% set by the Mines and Minerals Act
2009. The new mining law is an important opportunity
to revise section 139(4) of the Mines and Minerals
Act 2009 to reflect original intentions. In addition, in
order to facilitate increased transparency, all mining
companies that are required to enter CDAs should be
required to publish their gross revenue on an annual
basis in ways that are culturally appropriate and
accessible to the public and specifically the community
parties to the CDA. This may mean holding annual
community meetings in which companies disclose
their annual gross revenue and relevant supporting
documentation so that communities understand
how community development contributions are
determined.
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“States must protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction
by third parties, including business enterprises. This requires taking appropriate steps to
prevent, investigate, punish and redress such abuse through effective policies, legislation,
regulations and adjudication.”
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights

The Government has the obligation to respect,
protect, and fulfill the human rights of its people.96
In the context of a mining project this requires the
enactment and implementation of laws that prevent
human rights abuses and provide redress in the case
of violations. The Government must proactively
monitor company activity in order to protect against
human rights violations.
A range of human rights can be negatively impacted
by a mining project. These include the right to
property, the right to food, the right to water, cultural
rights, the right to housing, and the right to an
adequate standard of living. These rights are closely
linked to and dependent on proper respect for land
rights, and mining projects can affect the rights of
men and women in different ways. If communities
are voluntarily or involuntarily resettled to make way
for a mining project, for example, there is a risk that
the resettlement could impact a community’s ability
to sustain its livelihood if livelihood restoration
programs are not implemented, or if they fail.
Resettlement may also impact a community’s ability
to grow and access food, or the community may be
relocated far from natural sources of water, affecting
its right to water.
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Sierra Leone’s Constitution 1991 recognizes and
protects the fundamental human rights of its people.
In addition, as a signatory to major international and
regional human rights instruments, Sierra Leone has
binding international human rights obligations. The
new mining law should not seek to ‘establish’ rights
but rather facilitate and regulate their protection
and fulfillment. For example, the recommendations
in the sections that cover access to and use of land,
consultation and consent requirements, and climate
and water, are provided with human rights protection
and fulfillment in mind.
Closely related to the human rights principle of inclusive
participation, (which has been covered in earlier
sections), is the right to access information. The
right to information is relevant from the earliest stage
of a project– from consultations and planning long
before licenses are granted, all the way through the
project life-cycle. Taken together, the Right to Access
Information Act 2013, the Environmental Protection
Agency Act 2008,97 the Environmental and Social
Regulations for the Minerals Sector 2012,98 the Model
CDA, and EITI standards are important safeguards of
the right to information. The new mining law may seek
to consolidate information disclosure requirements
in the new mining law for ease of reference (crossreferencing applicable laws), but should be very careful
not to narrow the right to information as expressed in
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the Right to Access Information Act 2013 or other
instruments. Instead, any protections of the right to
information in the new mining law should be guided
by the principle of maximum disclosure with positive
obligations on public bodies and private entities to
proactively publish information in accessible and
culturally appropriate formats.99 In any event, the
prohibition of the disclosure of information obtained
under the Mines and Minerals Act 2009 should be
amended to align with the Right to Access Information
Act 2013. As it currently stands, the Mines and
Minerals Law 2009 narrows the generally applicable
right as protected by the Right to Access Information
Act 2013. We recommend that the new mining law
clearly states that any provision in the new mining
law that prohibits the disclosure of information shall
not apply if it conflicts with rights protected by Sierra
Leone’s access to information laws or international
conventions to which Sierra Leone is a party.

Civil and political freedoms have in the past been
violated in the context of mining projects in Sierra
Leone. It is helpful that the Minerals Policy 2018
anticipates rolling out trainings for law enforcement
on the UN Guiding Principles. The Government
should consider incorporating relevant parts of the
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
into such trainings and in law.
The UN Guiding Principles and Human Rights100
should be incorporated as binding obligations in
the new mining law, with appropriate penalties for
non-compliance. The new mining law should oblige
companies to respect human rights including rights as
established in the laws of Sierra Leone and the regional
and international conventions to which Sierra Leone
is a party.101 The new mining law should also require
companies to undertake human rights due diligence
to “identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how
they address their impacts on human rights,” and put
in place processes to remedy any violations.102 This
includes tracking and publicly reporting on human
rights impacts.103

“In order to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their adverse
human rights impacts, business enterprises should carry out human rights due diligence.
The process should include assessing actual and potential human rights impacts,
integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and communicating how
impacts are addressed. Human rights due diligence: (a) Should cover adverse human
rights impacts that the business enterprise may cause or contribute to through its own
activities, or which may be directly linked to its operations, products or services by its
business relationships; c) Should be ongoing, recognizing that the human rights risks may
change over time as the business enterprise’s operations and operating context evolve.”
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, section 17 (a) and (c)
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